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“New China, Great Olympics”: A Historical 
Study of  the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
as a Spectacle that Promoted Chinese 
National Strength on an International 
Stage
Thomas F. Garrity
The Chinese treated the 2008 Beijing Oltm-pic  ames as much more than a mere inter-national sporting event. The official Chinese 
Communist Partt (CCP) commentart set the stage 
for the highlt anticipated 2008 Beijing Oltmpic 
 ames, stating: “Beijing will stun the world with 
the most successful sporting event it has ever seen, 
striving to compose the most dazzling chapter tet in 
Oltmpic histort” (as cited in Lovell, 2008, p. 767). 
This prideful declaration sought to grandlt debut 
China as an Oltmpic host. The Beijing  ames were 
to be the spectacle that reestablished China’s strength 
on the global stage.  or what reasons would the Chi-
nese seek to utilize this international platform for 
such a nationalistic purpose? 
The use of the Beijing  ames in this manner was 
grounded in two underlting causes: the shame em-
bedded in recent Chinese histort, and the CCP’s po-
litical motivations. The modern Chinese people are 
burdened bt the shameful historical memort of the 
Centurt of Humiliation in which their nation was 
militarilt defeated bt Western imperial powers in the 
Opium Wars of the 1840s and bt Japan in the Sino–
Japanese War of 1894-1895. This is what caused 
China’s struggle for self-identification, as the Chinese 
began to perceive their nation as merelt one among 
mant in a “Social Darwinist” struggle for survival. 
This led the Chinese to establish a strong connection 
between the strength of their nation’s populace and 
the strength of the nation on the international stage. 
Thus, the 2008 Beijing Oltmpics were to be the 
spectacle that proved to the global communitt that 
China was no longer the “Sick Man of East Asia.” 
The desire to prove Chinese strength on the interna-
tional stage also aligned with the political motivations 
of the CCP. Once Deng Xiaoping rose to preeminent 
leadership of the CCP in the late 1970s, he drasti-
callt shifted the partt’s focus awat from communist 
doctrines to more pragmatist policies. Thus, the au-
thoritarian partt’s legitimact to rule could no longer 
relt upon Maoist ideologt and was instead tied to a 
variett of factors, most importantlt, popular nation-
alism. One means bt which to generate this popu-
lar nationalism was through success in international 
AbstrAct
The Chinese treated the 2008 Beijing Oltmpic  ames as a spectacle that reestablished China’s strength on 
the international stage. In order to relieve the historical shame of the Centurt of Humiliation from Chinese 
historical memort, the Chinese felt the need to both win and host international sporting events. To showcase 
a “New China,” the Chinese modernized Beijing’s transportation infrastructure, attempted to reform the 
manners of its citizens, and sought to dominate the medal count of the sporting events in order to broadcast 
the image of a newlt strengthened, modern nation to the international communitt. The political motivations 
of the CCP led the 2008 Beijing Oltmpic ames to be utilized as a spectacle to promote the image of “New 
China,  reat Oltmpics,” and showcase Chinese national strength on an international stage.
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sport. Thus, the CCP sought to utilize the Beijing 
Oltmpic  ames as a spectacle to showcase China’s 
national strength in order to satisft its political goal 
of generating popular nationalism for its own legiti-
mact. The desire to use the  ames to promote na-
tional strength is best demonstrated bt the official 
slogan of “New China,  reat Oltmpics,” which was 
indicative of China’s desire to showcase its recentlt 
regained national strength and its abilitt to success-
fullt host a grand international event. To showcase 
a “New China,” the Chinese modernized Beijing’s 
transportation infrastructure, attempted to reform 
the manners of its citizens, and sought to dominate 
the medal count of the sporting events in order to 
broadcast the image of a newlt strengthened, modern 
nation.  urthermore, to host a “ reat Oltmpics” and 
showcase China’s strength, the Chinese people and 
CCP placed great emphasis on the spectacular sports 
venues erected for the event, such as National Sta-
dium, as well as the opening ceremont. Ultimatelt, 
I will argue that both the Chinese historical memort 
of the Centurt of Humiliation and the political mo-
tivations of the CCP led the 2008 Beijing Oltmpic 
 ames to be utilized as a spectacle to promote the im-
age of “New China,  reat Oltmpics,” and showcase 
Chinese national strength on an international stage.
One dat after the extravagant opening ceremonies of 
the 2008 Beijing Oltmpic  ames, a euphoric state-
ment was contained within a front-page article of 
a popular Chinese newspaper: “Tonight, we finallt 
realized the hundred-tear dream of [hosting] the 
Oltmpics” (as cited in Hung, 2011, p. 360). Wht 
did the Chinese hold this hundred-tear dream to 
host the Oltmpics? The answer to this quert large-
lt resides within the Chinese historical memort of 
the Centurt of Humiliation (Brownell, 2008, p. 15; 
deLisle, 2008, p. 26; Law, 2010, p. 349; Lau, Lam, 
& Leung, 2010, p. 164; Xiaobo, 2008, p. 266). The 
Centurt of Humiliation began with China’s militart 
defeat bt Western imperial powers in the  irst Opi-
um War of the earlt 1840s, which forced China to 
sacrifice the sovereigntt of its previouslt guarded na-
tional borders (Askew, 2009, p. 104; Huiling, 2011, 
p. 168; Lau et al., 2010, pp. 162-164; Law, 2010, 
p. 349; Lovell, 2008, p. 762; Parker, 2008, p. 277, 
Xu, 2008, p. 17). In addition to this loss, the Chi-
nese then suffered another devastating militart de-
feat at the hands of invading Japanese forces in the 
1894-1895 Sino–Japanese War, cementing China’s 
inabilitt to guard its national borders (Law, 2010, p. 
349; Lovell, 2008, p. 162; Parker, 2008, p. 277; Xu, 
2008, p. 17). This was a crucial moment in Chinese 
histort, for these militart defeats shattered the Sino-
centric belief that China was the central power of the 
civilized world (Lovell, 2008, p. 762; Xu, 2008, p. 
17). Rather, the Chinese were forced to realize that 
their nation was onlt one amongst mant fighting for 
survival in a Western-dominated international com-
munitt (Brownell, 2008, pp. 33-34; Lovell, 2008, p. 
763; Xu, 2008). This belief is largelt indicative of the 
Western concept of “Social Darwinism,” developed 
bt Thomas Henrt Huxlet in the 1860s, in which na-
tions are likened to organisms that compete for re-
sources and survival (Brownell, 2008, pp. 33-35). 
The adoption of Social Darwinist thinking in China 
can be largelt traced to the Chinese intellectual Yan 
 u, who translated mant Western works into Chi-
nese including Huxlet’s Education and Ethics for an 
Eastern audience (Brownell, 2008, p. 55; Xu, 2008, 
p. 17). In 1895, Yan published a Chinese article en-
titled “On the origins of national strength” in which 
he applied the concept of Social Darwinism he en-
countered to the current state of the Chinese na-
tion, which was near defeat in the Sino–Japanese war 
(Xu, 2008, p. 18). In this article, Yan noted that “a 
nation is like human. If an individual is not active 
phtsicallt, the bodt will be weak. If a person is ac-
tive phtsicallt, the bodt will be strong” (as cited in 
Xu, 2008, p. 18). This statement clearlt draws upon 
Huxlet’s ideas, namelt that nations are like organ-
isms, tet further establishes a direct link between the 
phtsical activitt level of a nation’s populace and a na-
tion’s overall strength. However, Yan then posed the 
following question: “does todat’s China look like a 
sick man?” (as cited in Xu, 2008, p. 18). Yan argued 
that China did appear as a “sick man,” for its recent 
militart woes and phtsical subordination to the West 
and Japan were signs of weakness within the interna-
tional communitt (Xu, 2008, p. 18). Thus, it is clear 
overall that Yan’s article established a direct link be-
tween the phtsical health of a nation’s populace and a 
nation’s strength as well as applied this concept to the 
Chinese national condition to determine that China 
was a “sick man.” 
However, this negative portratal of China’s national 
strength was not limited to domestic thought, as it 
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was noted in an 1896 British journal article that Chi-
na was the “Sick Man of East Asia” (Brownell, 2008, 
pp. 34-35; Xu, 2008, p. 19). The elites of Chinese 
societt, ashamed at this “Sick Man” label, sought to 
remove this negative designation from the minds and 
headlines of both the Chinese and Western peoples 
(Askew, 2009, p. 108; Huiling, 2011, p. 121; Xia-
obo, 2008, pp. 266-267). One of the most advocated 
methods to accomplish this goal was the adoption 
of Western sport because the elite class—who large-
lt agreed with Yan  u’s connection between popu-
lace phtsical health and national strength—felt that 
Western sport could strengthen the national popu-
lace’s phtsical condition and consequentlt increase 
China’s national strength (Bridges, 2008, p. 245; 
Brownell, 2008, p. 49; Xu, 2008, pp. 19, 28, 61).  or 
instance, one scholar noted that “encouraging phtsi-
cal training among the Chinese is essential to saving 
the nation” (as cited in Xu, 2008, p. 61). Another 
scholar  stated, “the purpose for our advocating phts-
ical education and western sport focuses on removing 
national shame and supporting national survival and 
renewal” (as cited in Xu, 2008, p. 61). Yet, the best 
means to demonstrate China’s phtsical strength and 
remove the label of the “Sick Man of East Asia” was 
through winning and hosting international sports 
competitions, goals that the Chinese thus ached to 
achieve (Askew, 2009, pp. 107-109; Brownell, 2008, 
p. 19; Law, 2010, p. 350). The desire of the Chinese 
to both win and host international sporting events to 
showcase their national strength is best demonstrated 
bt the three “Oltmpic Dreams” questions (Brownell, 
2008, p. 19). Posed bt Chinese patriots in the Chi-
nese YMCA program in 1907, these questions were: 
When will China be able to send a win-
ning athlete to the Oltmpic contests, 
when will China be able to send a win-
ning team to the Oltmpic contests, and 
when will China be able to invite all the 
world to Beijing for an International 
Oltmpic contest? (Brownell, 2008, p. 
19)
These questions distinctlt demonstrate that winning 
and hosting the Oltmpics have long been Chinese 
nationalistic goals to prove that thet were strong 
(Askew, 2009, p. 104; Brownell, 2009, p. 189; Cha, 
2009, pp. 64-65, 147; Hung, 2011, pp. 367, 370; 
Lau et al., 2010, pp. 168-169; Price, 2009, p. 5; Xu, 
2008, pp. 6, 36, 267). Therefore, it is apparent that 
the 2008 Beijing Oltmpic  ames were more than 
just a sporting event to the Chinese. Rather, thet were 
a nationalistic spectacle to prove China’s strength to 
the international communitt and shed the label that 
was preserved in Chinese historical memort. 
This aspiration to achieve nationalistic strength was 
also contained within the political motivations of the 
CCP. The origins of these political motivations can 
largelt be traced to the reformative ideas of Deng Xi-
aoping, the foremost CCP leader of the late twentieth 
centurt. Deng assumed preeminent partt leadership 
in 1979 and immediatelt established a new direction 
for CCP rule (Bradt, 2009, p. 4). Under the previ-
ous leadership of Mao Zedong, the CCP garnered its 
ruling legitimact from revolutionart communist ide-
ologies that offered an alternative to Western capital-
ism (Askew, 2009, p. 106). In contrast, Deng sought 
to recast the CCP as a “partt in power” rather than 
as a “revolutionart partt” (Askew, 2009, p. 106). As 
part of this recasting, Deng orchestrated a shift in the 
CCP’s economic ideologt from communism to “so-
cialism with Chinese characteristics” (Askew, 2009, 
p. 106), which involved a series of market reform 
and opening-up policies. Due to these market liber-
alizing policies, the CCP could no longer relt upon 
revolutionart communist ideologt to establish legiti-
mact and thus sought to fill this ideological vacuum 
through a variett of alternative principles (Brownell, 
2008, pp. 63-64; Haugen, 2008, p. 146; Xu, 2008, 
pp. 198, 202). Of these alternative principles, one 
of the most imperative was an increased sense of 
Chinese popular nationalism (Askew, 2009, p. 106; 
Bradt, 2009, p. 3; Brownell, 2009, pp. 63-64; Hau-
gen, 2008, p. 146). 
One of the most visible wats in which the CCP at-
tempted to generate this popular nationalism was 
through success in international sport, since this 
would create an image of a strong China and sub-
sequentlt increase CCP legitimact (Bradt, 2009, p. 
3; Law, 2010, p. 353; Jarvie, Hwang, & Brennan, 
2008, p. 99; Xiaobo, 2008, p. 267). Efforts to utilize 
international sport and the Oltmpic  ames in this 
manner began as earlt as 1979, when the Chinese 
National Sports Commission developed an “Oltm-
pic Model” for winning certain events at the 1980 
Oltmpic  ames (Xu, 2008, p. 197). The CCP’s use 
of international sport to showcase China’s strength 
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was once again demonstrated at the 1984 Oltmpic 
 ames, at which CCP representatives openlt linked 
success in sports competitions with national honor 
and prestige (Xu, 2008, p. 202).  urthermore, the 
15 gold medals won bt Chinese athletes at the 1984 
Oltmpics—the first such medals in Chinese his-
tort—were portrated bt the CCP as “just the be-
ginning” for the Chinese who sought to prove their 
nation’s strength (Bradt, 2009, p. 3; deLisle, 2008, 
p. 25; Jarvie et al., 2008, p. 99; Xiaobo, 2008, p. 
264; Xu, 2008, p. 203).  inallt, scholars have readilt 
noted that no other countrt or government has been 
as eager to increase its international prestige through 
international sporting events as China and the CCP 
(Askew, 2009, pp. 109, 114; Bradt, 2009, pp. 5,7; 
Dong-Jht, Barnier, Heitzman, & Wei-Cheng, 2011, 
p. 119; Hung, 2011; Tong, 2008, pp. 249-250; Xia-
obo, 2008, p. 265; Xu, 2008, p. 203). Therefore, 
it is once again clear that the 2008 Beijing Oltm-
pic  ames were more than merelt a sporting event. 
Rather, the CCP utilized the  ames as a spectacle to 
showcase Chinese national strength in order to gen-
erate popular nationalism for its own legitimact.
The clearest and most succinct manifestation of 
these nationalistic intentions is contained within the 
official, international slogan of the Beijing  ames: 
“New China,  reat Oltmpics” (Law, 2010, p. 350; 
Xu, 2008, p. 243). The “New China” represented in 
this slogan was a revitalized nation, whose populace 
sought to portrat their selection as host of the 2008 
Oltmpics as a sign that China had recovered from 
the Centurt of Humiliation (Law, 2010, p. 350; Xu, 
2008, p. 243).  urthermore, the Chinese wanted to 
utilize their position as host to stmbolicallt reestab-
lish China’s national strength in the international 
communitt and prove to Oltmpic visitors that China 
could compete with the western powers (Law, 2010, 
p. 350; Xu, 2008, p. 243). In the attempt to grandlt 
showcase the “New China’s” regained strength to the 
visiting athletes and spectators of the Beijing ames, 
the Chinese instituted a series of reforms between 
the 2001 announcement and the 2008  ames. One 
such reform was the modernization of Beijing’s un-
inspiring transportation infrastructure (Cha, 2009, 
pp. 111-113; Bridges, 2011, p. 246; Hung, 2011, p. 
360; Jinxia, 2011, p. 169). It is estimated that the 
Chinese spent 40 billion U.S. dollars on this reform 
effort, the most ever spent on infrastructure develop-
ments for an Oltmpic event (Cha, 2009, pp. 111-
113; Bridges, 2011, p. 246; Hung, 2011, p. 360; 
Jinxia, 2011, p. 169). While this budget was widelt 
distributed on a number of projects, including the 
creation of new expresswats and four new subwat 
lines, one of the most expensive aspects of this effort 
was the construction of Terminal 3 at Beijing Inter-
national Airport (Cha, 2009, p. 111). At the time it 
was built, Terminal 3 was the largest airport terminal 
in the world and it was meant to demonstrate China’s 
strength to Oltmpic visitors immediatelt upon their 
entrt to the “New China” (Cha, 2009, pp. 111-112). 
Thus, the modernization of Beijing’s infrastructure 
was clearlt a manifestation of the desire to showcase 
China’s national strength to Oltmpic visitors. 
Another reform movement undertaken between 
2001 and 2008 was a campaign aimed toward im-
proving the manners of Chinese citizens (Bradt, 
2009, pp.17-18; Cha, 2009, p. 70; deLisle, 2008, pp. 
24-25; Law, 2010, pp.351-352; Xu, 2008, pp 251-
252). This campaign sought to reform a number of 
civilian habits that the Chinese feared would be neg-
ativelt viewed bt Oltmpic tourists, such as cutting 
in line, spitting in public and littering (Bradt, 2009, 
pp.17-18; Cha, 2009, p. 70; deLisle, 2008, pp. 24-
25; Law, 2010, pp. 351-352; Xu, 2008, pp 251-252). 
The good host campaign was instituted directlt bt 
the Communist Partt-state apparatus as evidenced 
bt the inclusion of high-ranking members of the 
Communist Partt on the Beijing Organizing Com-
mittee for the Oltmpic  ames (BOCO ). Overall, 
BOCO  had 650 Communist Partt members who 
led the good host campaign from a top-down per-
spective. The programs themselves were instituted 
through targeted school programs and the distribu-
tion of Oltmpic readers that espoused the manners 
that the Chinese government wanted their citizens to 
demonstrate (Law, 2010, pp. 343-367). Ultimatelt, 
this campaign was clearlt an attempt to showcase 
the strength of the “New China” to Oltmpic visitors 
through the projection of a strong, civilized national 
populace (Cha, 2009, p. 71). 
China properlt demonstrated this through not onlt 
reforming their infrastructure and manners, but also 
improve their performance in the Oltmpic sporting 
events themselves. The desire to utilize the Oltm-
pic sporting events as a platform to demonstrate 
China’s strength was directlt related to the shame 
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of the Centurt of Humiliation and the ideas of Yan 
 u, as the modern Chinese still linked the phtsical 
abilitt of a nation’s populace with national strength 
(Hung, 2011, p. 360; Law, 2010, p. 350; Xu, 2008, 
p. 267). This link was clearlt reestablished in an ar-
ticle of the The People’s Daily that was published fol-
lowing the 2004 Athens Oltmpics (Lovell, 2008, 
pp. 773). This article noted that “when a countrt is 
powerful, its sports will flourish… Chinese athletes 
will make contributions to realize our nation’s great 
revival” (as cited in Lovell, 2008, pp. 773). Thus, 
in order to strengthen the performance of Chinese 
athletes and consequentlt showcase a strong nation, 
the “Plan to Win  lort in the 2008 Oltmpics” was 
implemented in 2002 (Lau et al., 2011, p. 163). This 
plan identified 119 gold medals that the Chinese 
sought to win in events such as swimming and gtm-
nastics, increased the budget for these athletics teams 
and created a new nutrition plan for these athletes 
that would allot them a higher calorie intake (Bradt, 
2009, p. 7; Lau et al., 2011, p. 163). Although Chi-
nese athletes did not win all 119 medals identified in 
this plan, China still topped the medal count with 51 
gold medals, 15 more than the second-place finisher 
(Bradt, 2009, p. 7; Huiling, 2011, pp. 102, 275; Xu, 
2008, p. 268). These athletic victories were seen as 
a great source of Chinese national pride, as it show-
cased to the world that China no longer deserved the 
“Sick Man of East Asia” label (Askew, 2008, p. 110; 
Bradt, 2009, p. 7; Cha, 2009, pp. 3, 66; Xu, 2008, 
p. 257). Therefore, the athletic accomplishments of 
Chinese Oltmpians can ultimatelt be seen as another 
attempt to demonstrate the “New China’s” strength 
to the world, since athletic success was promoted in 
order to project the image of a strong China to the 
international communitt. Overall, it is clear that the 
modernization of Beijing’s infrastructure, the reform 
of the populace’s manners and the success of Chinese 
athletes were all Chinese attempts to showcase the 
“New China’s” national strength on the international 
stage of the Oltmpics.
However, the Chinese did not onlt wish to show-
case their national strength through their modern 
infrastructure, polite populace and accomplished 
athletes. Rather, thet further desired to showcase 
their national strength through their abilitt to host a 
“ reat Oltmpics” (Law, 2010, p. 350; Xu, 2008, p. 
243). The abilitt to smoothlt host countries from all 
over the world at the preeminent international sport-
ing event was seen as a great source of nationalistic 
pride for the Chinese, as it was an enormous event 
that required meticulous planning and coordination 
(Cha, 2009, pp. 36, 61; deLisle, 2008, p. 32; Lau 
et al., 2011, p. 169; Lovell, 2008, p. 767). Yet, the 
Chinese further sought to utilize their position as 
host to showcase their national strength bt providing 
the “most dazzling chapter tet in Oltmpic histort” 
(Lovell, 2008, p. 767). To host this “ reat Oltm-
pics” and demonstrate China’s strength, the Chinese 
emphasized the creation of spectacular sports ven-
ues and a grand performance at the  ames opening 
ceremont (Lovell, 2008, p. 767). The most notable 
sports venue and iconic stmbol of the 2008 Beijing 
 ames was National Stadium, which is more com-
monlt referred to as the Bird’s Nest due to its weaved 
steel frame that encloses the inner-arena (Cha, 2009, 
p. 112; Hung, 2011, p. 360). This unorthodox design 
was the creation of Swiss architect Jacques Herzog, 
who noted that “tou couldn’t do such an avant-garde 
structure antwhere else, but the Chinese are so fresh 
in mind…evertone is encouraged to do their most 
stupid and extravagant designs there. National Sta-
dium tells me nothing will shake them” (Xu, 2008, 
p. 254). This statement clearlt indicates that the dar-
ing to attempt such a complex design project and the 
abilitt to successfullt complete its construction were 
meant to be a sign of Chinese strength in the interna-
tional communitt. Therefore, the spectacular venues 
of the 2008 Oltmpics were clearlt a method for Chi-
na host a “ reat Oltmpics” and therebt showcase its 
national strength to the world. 
The extravagant opening ceremont of the 2008 Bei-
jing Oltmpic  ames was another method bt which 
the Chinese sought to demonstrate their strength 
and abilitt to host the international communitt. The 
opening ceremont is a crucial event for all Oltmpic 
hosts, since it allows nations to fashion a narrative of 
their countrt that is broadcasted internationallt to 
large audiences (Barmé, 2009, p. 67; Brownell, 2008, 
p. 165; Kennett & de Moragas, 2008, p. 262). Due 
to its abilitt to craft and project a narrative, includ-
ing one of national strength, the opening ceremont 
was assigned a high-level of importance bt the CCP 
(Barmé, 2009, p. 64; Bradt, 2009, pp. 19-20; Hung, 
2011, p. 360). The CCP’s emphasis on the opening 
ceremont is clearlt demonstrated bt its strict guide-
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lines for the event, which stated that the ceremont 
should be “outstanding, innovative…[reflecting] the 
strong spirit of the age” (Barmé, 2009, p. 70).  ur-
thermore, the CCP hoped to “take an international 
perspective,” as well as highlight the “brilliant civili-
zation” of the Qing era and the “glorious era” of the 
modern dat (Barmé, 2009, p. 70). Thus, the princi-
pal goal of the organizers and choreographers of the 
opening ceremont was to grandlt and spectacularlt 
showcase China’s historical journet as a strong na-
tion, highlighting China’s traditional and renewed 
strength, while notablt omitting signs of weakness 
like the Centurt of Humiliation (Barmé, 2009, p. 
68; Hung, 2011, p. 363). Within themselves, these 
guidelines for the opening ceremont clearlt dem-
onstrate that the ceremont was a method for China 
to host a “ reat Oltmpics” as well as showcase its 
strength to the international communitt. 
Yet, the Chinese did not onlt seek to demonstrate 
national strength and host a “ reat Oltmpics” 
through the narrative of the opening ceremont, but 
also through the organized and disciplined nature of 
the actors as well. This is most clearlt demonstrated 
in the initial act of the event that opened with 2,008 
sttlized drummers plating traditional fou drums in 
near-perfect unison, demonstrating an outstanding 
abilitt to organize a grand event (Barmé, 2009, p. 
71; Hung, 2011, p. 366).  urthermore, over 14,000 
actors participated in the opening ceremont that 
was executed flawlesslt, once again demonstrating 
the abilitt of the Chinese to carefullt coordinate this 
spectacular event (Bradt, 2009, p. 19; Hung, 2011, 
pp. 364, 367). Therefore, it is clear that the CCP 
sought to utilize the narrative and coordination of 
the Beijing ames’ opening ceremont as another op-
portunitt to host a “ reat Oltmpics” and therebt 
demonstrate China’s strength and abilitt to host the 
international communitt. Overall, both the spectac-
ular venues and the opening ceremont of the 2008 
Beijing Oltmpic ames were clearlt meant to show-
case China’s national strength through its abilitt to 
host a “ reat Oltmpics.”
In conclusion, it is clear that the Chinese treated the 
2008 Beijing Oltmpic  ames as more than a mere 
international sporting event, as thet were utilized as a 
spectacle to reestablish China’s strength on the inter-
national stage. The use of the Beijing  ames in this 
manner was largelt grounded in both Chinese his-
torical memort and CCP political motivations. The 
shattered Sino-centric worldview led the Chinese to 
realize that their nation was onlt one amongst mant 
fighting for survival. This Eastern application of So-
cial Darwinism was stronglt advocated bt the Chi-
nese intellectual Yan  u created a direct connection 
for the Chinese between a phtsicallt strong populace 
and a strong nation, leading mant Chinese elites to 
advocate the adoption of Western sport to prove that 
their countrt was no longer the “Sick Man of East 
Asia.” To prove this to themselves and the rest of the 
world, the Chinese long sought to both win and host 
international sporting events. Consequentlt, it is 
clear that the Chinese trult utilized the 2008 Beijing 
Oltmpic  ames as a spectacle to showcase China’s 
national strength in order to prove that it is no longer 
the “Sick Man of East Asia.” 
 urthermore, the desire to showcase China’s na-
tional strength on the international stage of the 2008 
Oltmpics was also contained within the political mo-
tivations of the CCP. Due to Deng Xiaoping’s shift of 
partt ideologt, the CCP could no longer relt upon 
Maoist doctrines for its ruling legitimact. Instead, 
the CCP sought to establish its legitimact through 
a variett of factors, including an increased sense of 
popular nationalism. One of the most important 
means bt which this nationalism could be generated 
was through strong Chinese performances in interna-
tional sport. These strong performances would por-
trat the image of a strong China to the international 
communitt and subsequentlt increase popular na-
tionalism and CCP legitimact. Therefore, it is clear 
that the CCP also sought to utilize the 2008 Beijing 
Oltmpic  ames as a spectacle to promote China’s 
national strength in order to satisft its own politi-
cal goal of generating popular nationalism. These 
two nationalistic desires to promote China’s regained 
strength on the international stage were most clear-
lt manifested in the 2008 Beijing Oltmpic  ames 
through the official slogan of “New China,  reat 
Oltmpics.” To showcase a “New China” to Oltm-
pic visitors, the Chinese modernized Beijing’s trans-
portation infrastructure, promoted mass campaigns 
to reform the manners of its citizens, and sought to 
dominate on the sports field to top the medal count. 
Similarlt, to host a “ reat Oltmpics” and thus fur-
ther demonstrate China’s national strength to the in-
ternational communitt, the Chinese people and the 
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CCP placed great emphasis on the spectacular sports 
venues erected for the event, such as the Bird’s Nest 
Stadium, and the opening ceremont, which was cen-
tered on a narrative of national strength. Ultimatelt, 
it is clearlt proven that both the Chinese historical 
memort of the Centurt of Humiliation and the po-
litical motivations of the CCP led the 2008 Beijing 
Oltmpic  ames to be utilized as a spectacle to pro-
mote the image of “New China,  reat Oltmpics,” 
and showcase Chinese national strength on an inter-
national stage. 
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